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THE INTERPLAY OF COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS AND
PERSONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS
Edgar A. Jones, Jr.t
The story of the legal ramifications of the personal service contract
in the entertainment industry1 got an obscure start in ancient Rome
where a remedy was given to an owner for the mistreatment of his slaves.
Centuries later in England, human life was devastated during the 1348-
1349 "Black Death" bubonic plague, resulting in a great shortage of la-
borers of all kinds. The scarcity of human resources led to the enactment
of the Ordinance of Laborers which established a system of compulsory
labor, binding servants to remain with their masters. Penalties were im-
posed to keep scarce servants in place to prevent them from seeking
higher wages from another master. An action for enticing or harboring a
servant was given to the master against anyone who had received and
employed his runaway servant.
After further centuries of evolution, there emerged the modem prin-
t Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles; member, National Academy
of Arbitrators.
This paper was delivered at the First Annual Entertainment Industry Labor Law Confer-
ence, organized and sponsored by the Labor Law Section of the Los Angeles County Bar
Association.
The author has taught courses in labor law and arbitration at UCLA since 1951 and has
served as an arbitrator in over 100 cases in the theatrical motion picture and television indus-
try, as well as the legitimate theater under the jurisdiction of Actors Equity, since his first
entertainment case in 1957. He has also had his own experience with personal service con-
tracts and collective bargaining agreements during a six-year period, 1958-1964, when he ap-
peared in the starring role of "Judge" in over 2,000 half hours of network television in three
ABC-TV Network programs: Day in Court, Traffic Court, and Accused, negotiating and exe-
cuting a number of personal service contracts under AFTRA jurisdiction.
1. One should note the somewhat ambitious scope of the phrase "entertainment indus-
try." Visual and audio entertainment products are almost infinitely varied today, defying con-
tainment within the perimeters only of theatrical and television pictures, television
programming, or legitimate stage productions. The broad spectrum of multi-million dollar
collegiate and professional sports, for example, comprises a major sector of the modern en-
tertainment industry, and others readily come to mind as well. We are undoubtedly the most
constantly entertained people in the history of the world with our movie and stage theaters,
stadiums, auditoriums, fields, parks and other settings, and most of all, and often simultane-
ously, in homes here, and throughout the world by satellites, in which consuming viewers sit
before their televisions and VCR's to watch live, taped or rented video programs displayed on
their screens. Even with lions and Christians, compared to us Nero was a Piker!
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ciple that is protective of the relationships undertaken in what we now
term personal service contracts. It blossomed on the London stage in the
person of Ms. Johanna Wagner, an operatic singer of some repute. She
had entered into a contract with Lumley to sing during a certain time in
his Queen's Theatre for performing operas. But Gye, a competing thea-
ter owner, wanted to present her dulcet voice in his theater. When it
appeared that she was succumbing to Gye's blandishments, Lumley
brought about a landmark in the law of equitable relief by succeeding in
his suit in Chancery to enjoin her from breaking the negative covenant in
her contract by singing for Gye, as well as enjoining Gye from accepting
her services.2
Not content with setting a landmark in equity, Lumley also success-
fully brought a common law action against Gye, thereby enabling the
Queen's Bench to give birth to the general principle that one is liable for
improper interference with a contractual relationship. The Queen's
Bench held that "an action will lie by the proprietor of a theatre against a
person who maliciously procures an entire abandonment of a contract to
perform exclusively at that theatre for a certain time; whereby damage
was sustained." 3 Although at first viewed somewhat askance, today
Lumley v. Gye is accorded full acceptance in English and American law
as to any contract, regardless of its character, so long as the defendant
intends to interfere with plaintiff's contractual relations and knows that
interference will result.4
Moving ahead into the twentieth century in our saga, when the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act was enacted in 1935, Congress adopted the
basic commitment of the American polity to the majoritarian principle in
the designation or selection of representatives of employees for the pur-
poses of collective bargaining. But at the same time, Congress in section
9(a) gave guarded acknowledgment to the need to protect the rights of
individual employees from being stifled by the collective will.5
Ever since the founding of the republic there has been a continuing
oscillation of policy between those two analytical irreconcilables, the fun-
damental commitment to majority rule and durable presence of the
American phenomenon of individualism. Collective bargaining makes
this tension between fundamental concepts very visible, particularly in
2. Lumley v. Wagner 1 De G.M. & G. 604, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (1852).
3. Lumley v. Gye, 2 EI.&B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749. (Q.B. 1853).
4. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 980-82 (5th ed. 1984).
5. The proviso in section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act read in 1935:
"[P]rovided, that any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer...." National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1,
49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1990)).
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the entertainment industry. It is quite common and expressly sanctioned
by industry bargainers for personal service contracts to be negotiated by
talent with employers who are parties to those collective agreements.
There is no Ordinance of Laborers to constrain industry employers from
competing to attract above-the-line talent from one to another employer.
This is so even though the enticed employee is a member of a guild bar-
gaining unit who, in the process of individual negotiation, will obtain
overscale contractual provisions that are substantially more rewarding in
wages, hours and conditions of employment than those available to other
members of the same bargaining unit.
This, of course, is but a recognition of the economic realities that are
characteristic of this industry. All, from the most established Screen Ac-
tors Guild ("SAG") or American Federation of Television and Radio
Actors ("AFTRA") performer, Directors Guild of America ("DGA")
director, Writers Guild of America ("WGA") writer, or International
Association of Theatrical and Stage Employees ("IATSE") director of
photography, set director, film editor, or the like, to the most recent as-
piring entrant to any of the guilds or unions in the industry, start out as
equal persons, identified only by their respective seniority in their partic-
ular bargaining units. However, a few emerge by talent or acclaim as
more equal than others. As a miniscule but significant percentage move
up and out from the quality of the unit into the magical world of the
"deal memo," the overscale individual employment contract for personal
services, and perhaps also into that delightful legal enclave, the economic
penultimate, the Internal Revenue Service's gift to the industry, the
"loan-out" agreement.
This emergence of the few from the collective cocoon attests to a
basic phenomenon of the entertainment industry which is the driving
motor for this tolerated, even encouraged differentiation among equals.
In the popular media of entertainment there exists, without exception,
the phenomenon of the publicly acclaimed individual who somehow has
come to preoccupy the interest of consumers and critics. It is unques-
tionably true that that person - or rather, that persona - is wholly
reliant for success upon the concerted efforts of the "necessary others,"
the talented people without whose imaginative and technical participa-
tion that out-front individual - "the star" - could not possibly exist.
With few exceptions, those "necessary others" are compensated and
dealt with strictly within the parameters of the collective-bargaining
agreement. In establishing fair and realistic compensation in this indus-
try, it is accepted that this uniqueness of persona, in and of itself, has a
1991]
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determinable market value and is a commodity warranting additional
compensation.
However, in laying the analytical foundation for the Supreme
Court's reasoning in accommodating these two different types of contrac-
tual undertakings - the collective agreement and the individual employ-
ment or personal service contract - Justice Jackson in 1944 observed in
JI. Case v. NLRB 6 that "[t]he practice and philosophy of collective bar-
gaining looks with suspicion on such individual advantages." But, signif-
icantly, he added, "[o]f course, where there is great variation in
circumstances of employment or capacity of employees, it is possible for
the collective bargain to prescribe only minimum rates or maximum
hours or expressly to leave certain areas open to individual bargaining." 7
Nonetheless, he continued, "[w]e cannot except individual contracts gen-
erally from the operation of collective ones, and whether under some
circumstances they may add to them in matters covered by the collective
bargain, we leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the laws
of contracts applicable."'
Three years later, in 1947, Congress enacted section 301 which ap-
peared in 1955 to be no more than "a mere procedural provision" 9 open-
ing the federal court door but without the creation of any substantive
federal law. Then the Supreme Court took hold of it in 1957 in Textile
Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 10 proving it to be otherwise. The Court,
through Justice Douglas, summoned from section 301 a congressional
intent that called for a "range of judicial inventiveness" which would "be
determined by the nature of the problem." Federal law, not state law,
would govern but state law could serve as a resource in finding "the rule
that will best effectuate the federal policy," although the state law would
not constitute "an independent source of private rights.""
In 1962, in a strong and surprising move in the direction of individ-
ualism, the Court expanded the entry to the federal courthouse under
section 301 to include individual employees. The Court held that Con-
gress had given the right to sue for breach of a collective-bargaining
agreement. 12 However, deference to individuals was quickly followed by
an oscillation back towards the collectivity when the Court held in Re-
6. 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
7. Id. at 338.
8. Id. at 339.
9. Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437, 449
(1955) (Frankfurter, J., plurality opinion).
10. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
11. Id. at 457.
12. Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 199 (1962).
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public Steel Corp. v. Maddox 13 that an individual employee could not
enter that courtroom door without her union bargaining representative
fronting for her unless she had first exhausted the collectively bargained
grievance remedies and been wrongfully barred access to them. 4
The Court seemed to be working out what it had intended in 1944 in
JI. Case with Justice Jackson's Delphic observation that "[i]ndividual
contracts cannot subtract from collective ones, and whether under some
circumstances they may add to them in matters covered by the collective
bargain, we leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the laws
of contracts applicable."' 5 What had started out to be a reliance upon
the "judicial inventiveness" of the federal judiciary - an oxymoron if
ever there was one - quite shortly had given way to the realization that
the arbitral baby born in Lincoln Mills was quite apt to be smothered in
its crib by the rough handling of the judges, to whose care and nurturing
the Court had naively committed it. When that became almost immedi-
ately evident, the Court acted three years after Lincoln Mills in the Steel-
workers Trilogy'6 in what was to become a determined effort, albeit
frustratingly recurrent,"' to remove judges from tending the foundling
whom a number of them had evidently concluded to be some kind of an
illegitimate Quasimodo.II
The section 301 decisions of the Supreme Court have been based on
an acceptance of the concurrent jurisdiction of state courts although, as
we have seen, the law applied must be regarded as federal. Even if the
state court draws on state law concepts to fill in a gap of policy, its ra-
tionale by a process of instant osmosis becomes federal law. On the other
hand, in contrast to the concurrence of jurisdiction of section 301, the
Court has worked out an elaborate web of federal-state preemption doc-
trines to cover the main body of regulatory law enacted by Congress in
13. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
14. Id.
15. J.. Case, 321 U.S. at 339.
16. Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Naval Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
17. See W.R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757 (1983); AT&T Technologies,
Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643 (1986); United Paperworkers v.
Misco, 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
18. See, e.g., Stead Motors of Walnut Creek v. Automotive Machinists, 886 F.2d 1200,
1217 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (dissenting opinion); Delta Queen Steamboat Co. v. District 2,
Marine Engineers, 889 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1989) en banc review denied, BNA DLR No. 71, at
A-12 (April 12, 1990) (four dissenters).
Webster's third unabridged dictionary has the following entry for "Quasimodo": "In
Victor Hugo's Notre Dame de Paris, a foundling humpback, strong and ugly, but with a tender
and chivalrous nature."
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1935, 1947 and 1959 to govern American labor-management relations
under the administrative aegis of the National Labor Relations Board. 19
For many years in practically all other American industries organ-
ized by labor unions, the majoritarian premise of collective bargaining
had removed the prospect of effective individual employment contracts
once persons had become classified as belonging to bargaining units rep-
resented by labor organizations.
Professor Archibald Cox was convinced that the interests of ag-
grieved individual employees would be better protected by strengthening
the representational role of unions while foreclosing individual causes of
action. He wrote, "[u]nless a contrary intention is manifest the em-
ployer's obligation under a collective bargaining agreement which con-
tains a grievance procedure controlled by the union shall be deemed to
run solely to the union as the bargaining representative. "20 This state-
ment became the premise of decades of legal evolution.
In 1984, however, Professor Clyde Summers, long an advocate of
individual employee rights, called for a revival of emphasis on the indi-
vidual contract of employment as a legal concept. He wrote:
The effect of this reasoning [espoused by Professor Cox] was to
convert the collective agreement from an instrument giving life
and substance to the individual contract of employment into an
instrument for subordinating individual rights .... Most un-
ions have sought, and employers have granted, grievance proce-
dures that expressly, or with the aid of the presumption, give
the union exclusive control.2 In all such cases, the individual
19. See generally, 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1504 (C. Morris 2d ed. 1983).
20. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 669 HARV. L. REV. 601, 619 (1956).
21. But cf. Jones, Michaelson's Food Services, Inc., 61 L.A. 1195 (1973). A grieving em-
ployee threatened a class action on behalf of himself and 300 others, charging that the com-
pany fraudulently underpaid wages in collusion with the union which denied such collusion.
The employee wanted to resolve his grievance through arbitration. However, the company
denied any wrongdoing and argued that arbitration was not available for this dispute because
there would be no assurance of a final disposition. An interim award was issued, directing the
union to seek its enforcement or have its grievance dismissed as not arbitrable. This award
established a workable structure for proceeding with class participation, designating each
grievant and class participant as "party" to be bound by the award, and requiring the union to
petition.
Enforcement was granted in part, denied in part, in Hotel & Restaurant Employees v.
Michaelson's Food Services, Inc., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir. 1976). The court stated that:
Although the usual procedure in an arbitration under a collective bargaining agree-
ment is to name the Union and the employer as parties, but not the employee whose
grievance is involved, the employee may be made a party. We conclude that the
arbitrator could designate [Grievant] Manning as a party, whether or not Manning
asked to be so designated. The arbitrator could not force Manning to participate, but
he could still proceed, and could make an award for or against circumstances, such
(Vol. I11
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has no contract rights; there can be no individual contract of
employment. Even those employees who might be able to bar-
gain for a substantial individual contract, or whose employer
might otherwise provide individual contracts, are barred by the
collective agreement from having any contract of employment
or contract rights.22
However variant those two conflicting premises may be concep-
tually, operationally they are continuously accommodated in this indus-
try. Nonetheless, one should recognize that the existence of this tension
between majoritarianism and individualism creates, almost on a daily ba-
sis, delicate problems of conflict of interest. These conflicts must be re-
solved administratively by guild officials, balancing individual claims
against the interests of the majority of their members. This process is
made much more difficult because an increasing number of disenchanted
employees continue to resort to duty-of-fair-representation litigation.
A unanimous Supreme Court came along in 1987 with an unsettling
opinion by Justice Brennan. With no reference to Professors Cox or
Summers, the Court stirred things up on the conceptual front with its
reasoning in Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams. 23 This time the Court oscil-
lated strongly toward individualism, considerably discounting Professor
Summers' pessimistic conclusions about the prospects for individual con-
tracts of employment. The Court attempted to mend the relationship of
its section 301 federal-state preemption concepts to the "well-pleaded
complaint rule," along with its "complete pre-emption corollary" in the
context of Caterpillar's removal of the case to a federal court from the
state one in which plaintiffs had filed their action against their employer.
This was 1984, the glory days for plaintiffs in California courts who be-
lieved themselves to have been wrongfully terminated.24
In framing their complaint, the employees had relied solely upon the
California wrongful-discharge law, undoubtedly to the consternation of
Caterpillar's lawyers in that pre-Foley period.2" They had steadfastly re-
fused to amend their complaint so as to attempt to state a lesser, poten-
as fraud, breach of duty of fair representation, and the like, even if he objected or
declined to participate.
Id at 17.
22. Summers, The Contract of Employment and the Rights of Individual Employee" Fair
Representation and Employment at Will, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1082, 1089 (1984).
23. 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
24. See Jung & Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge, 4 LAB. LAW. 257 (1988) (a
pre-Foley article realistically surveying the litigation scene).
25. See Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 254 Cal. Rptr. 211 (S. Ct. 1988); Jung & Hark-
ness, Life After Foley: The Bottom Line, 5 LAB. LAW. 667 (1989); Gomez, Entertainment
Contract Litigation After Foley, 23 Beverly Hills L. Rev. 345 (1989).
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tially remunerative claim under section 301 for the breach of alleged oral
promises of continued employment. Justice Brennan emphasized the
right of individual employee-plaintiffs to be "masters of the complaint."
They would thereby avoid removal of their case from the state to the
federal court. When all was said and done - with unaccustomed brev-
ity, eschewing philosophical inquiry for succinct dogmatic assertion -
the individual contract of employment had been pulled out into what has
certainly been an unaccustomed spotlight at center stage.
The essential facts were quite simple. The employees had been hired
into classifications that were encompassed by a duly certified Machinists
bargaining unit. Later, they became managerial or salaried employees
for a number of years, ranging from three to fifteen. During that time,
oral and written assurances were allegedly made to them that they:
could look forward to indefinite and lasting employment with
the corporation and that they could count on the corporation to
take care of them .... [W]hile serving Caterpillar as managers
or weekly salaried employees, [they] were assured that if the
San Leandro facility of Caterpillar ever closed, Caterpillar
would provide employment opportunities for [them] at other
facilities of Caterpillar, its subsidiaries, divisions, or related
companies [which] promises were continually and repeatedly
made, [creating] a total employment agreement wholly in-
dependent of the collective-bargaining agreement pertaining to
hourly employees.26
In reliance on these promises, the employees asserted that they
"continued to remain in Caterpillar's employ rather than seeking other
employment." Even when they were downgraded into the bargaining
unit, supervisors orally reassured them that the downgrade was tempo-
rary. Nevertheless, on December 15, 1983, they were notified that the
California San Leandro plant was about to close and that they would be
laid off.27
The employees sued Caterpillar, framing their causes of action
solely under California law for breach of their individual employment
contracts. The company removed them to the federal district court
which dismissed their claims when they refused to amend them to state a
section 301 cause of action. The Ninth Circuit reversed and was affirmed
by the Supreme Court which declared that their claims "did not require
interpretation or application of the collective-bargaining agreement."2
26. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 338 (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 388-89.
28. Id. at 398. The Court also rejected the circuit court's holding that a case cannot be
[Vol. I11
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Caterpillar argued that the individual's complaint was completely
preempted by section 301. The Court rejected that argument, asserting
that:
Section 301 governs claims founded directly on rights created
by collective-bargaining agreements, and also claims 'substan-
tially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment.' . . . Section 301 says nothing about the content or
validity of the individual employment contracts. [Nor was
their complaint] substantially dependent upon the interpreta-
tion of the collective-bargaining agreement. It does not rely
upon the collective agreement indirectly, nor does it address the
relationship between the individual contracts and the collective
agreement.29
Further, the Court noted that these employees "rely on contractual
agreements made while they were in managerial or weekly salaried posi-
tions - agreements in which the collective-bargaining agreement played
no part.",30 Justice Brennan did not say whether the fact that they were
not employed in the bargaining unit when the oral commitments were
made was of any particular significance. We may infer, however, that
such promises to workers in this hourly-rated classification would not be
binding unless, somehow, the Machinists had procured some contractual
provision that would have enabled those promises to these individual em-
ployees to be enforceable and not applicable to all of the other members
of the bargaining unit.31
Of course, in that event, the collective agreement would have been
directly involved. There would then have ensued the application of the
doctrine of preemption with which Caterpillar had sought to shield itself
from liability. The Court in these circumstances, however, referred to
the "irrelevance of the collective-bargaining agreement to these individ-
ual employment contracts."' 32 Of course, that too is a rather ambiguous
reference. One is prompted to ask, "What if the individual employment
contracts incorporated the grievance procedure by reference, terminating
in arbitration, as the mechanism for resolving any disputes concerning
the terms of the personal service contracts?" Would that incorporation
removed on the ground of preemption unless the federal cause of action asserted provides a
remedy for the plaintiff. Id. at 391 n.4.
29. Id. at 394.
30. Id. at 394 n.9.
31. See Jones, Western Airlines, Inc., 37 L.A. 700 (E. Jones, 1961) (terminated wildcat-
strike Flight Engineers contractually entitled to return to Machinists bargaining unit through
90-day bargaining unit reentry provision in Machinists agreement with airline).
32. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 395.
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by reference, in and of itself, be enough to convert the contractual rela-
tionship into one that should warrant preemption of state courts to deal
with the dispute?
It was clear enough to Justice Brennan (and the unanimous Court)
that "claims bearing no relationship to a collective-bargaining agreement
beyond the fact that they are asserted by an individual covered by such
an agreement are simply not pre-empted by section 301."3' Is that, we
may ask, because arbitration is properly to be regarded as a procedural
matter without any substantive content that might affect personal service
contract disputes? But then how should we reckon the substantive con-
tractual intent ascribed by prior arbitrators to the sort of issue presented
in this dispute that arises under this personal service contract?
Long-standing contractual principles of interpretation attest that an
arbitration award made during an earlier term of a collective-bargaining
agreement on a specific issue of contractual interpretation, unaltered dur-
ing subsequent negotiations, remains a binding interpretive ruling such
that it requires bilateral negotiations to alter the meaning attributed to
the contract by the arbitral award.34 For the purpose of preemption
analysis, does that convert the otherwise issue-sterile grievance proce-
dure into a substantively significant linkage between the collective agree-
ment and a relevant and contested personal service contract? If so, does
that not result in the preemption of state law as the determinant?
Given the widespread practice in the entertainment industry of in-
corporating by reference in personal service contracts the collective-bar-
gaining agreement's grievance procedures, including arbitration, we
might well consider what might be the portent of the following observa-
tion by Justice Brennan:
Caterpillar contends that the Court of Appeals' decision of-
fends the paramount national labor policy of referring disputes
to arbitration, since its collective-bargaining agreement with
the Union contains an arbitration clause. This argument
presumes that Respondents' claims are arbitrable, when, in
fact, they are alleged to grow out of individual employment
contracts to which the grievance-arbitration procedures in the
collective-bargaining agreement have no application.
Is Justice Brennan's "in fact" conclusion of non-arbitrability warranted
in the entertainment industry?
Recall Justice Jackson's anticipation in J.L Case of "whether under
33. Id. at 397 n. 11.
34. See discussion in Lucky Stores, Inc., 88-2 ARB $ 8316 at 4582 (Jones, 1988).
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some circumstances... [individual contracts] may add to... [collective-
bargaining agreements] in matters covered by the collective bargain, we
leave to be determined by appropriate forums under the laws of contracts
applicable . . . ." The Supreme Court's jurisdictional rationales have
clearly established that the preferred "appropriate forum" apply the
"laws of contracts applicable" to individual contracts in their inter-rela-
tionship with the collective-bargaining agreement is the forum of arbitra-
tion created by the employer and union in the collective agreement.
Let us relate that observation to the Hollywood sector of the en-
tertainment world which has been described in publications in all the
media as countless as the sands of the sea, seeking as broadly and engag-
ingly as possible to engage and stimulate the consuming public to em-
brace its visual products. But there is one set of industry publications
that is periodically produced for a considerably more limited audience -
the draftsmen themselves and those few others who must parse the indus-
try's collective bargaining agreements in the search for gleanings from
which to infer the parties' contractual intent. That intent must be found
in language that has been shaped over the decades by a process of ac-
cumulation; constantly adding, rarely relinquishing, words and phrases
that continue to grow and accumulate, changing shape and texture like
reefs of coral, clinging to the past while annexing the present.
Today, the SAG and WGA collective agreements are bulging with
intent expressed in hundreds of pages each. These collective agreements
rival the intricate interweavings of the most complex Byzantine tapestries
of the eleventh century. It has been covertly disclosed to me by reliable
sources, on a promise of no attribution, that there has for decades existed
an unpublicized side-bet competition between the negotiators of the
Screen Actors Guild and the Writers Guild - sparked by lawyers on
both sides of, as well as under, the bargaining table - that one can add
more words while losing less than the other in the course of bargaining a
new basic agreement. In a recent encounter in print, WGA weighed in
with 368 pages of fine print in its 1985 Basic Agreement, only to be
topped a year later by SAG which issued its own 1986 Basic Agreement
containing an overwhelming 387 pages of equally fine print. The winner
by nineteen pages!
Nor have the negotiators been content merely with semantic ac-
cumulation. They have coupled that tactic with miniaturizing its physi-
cal reproduction in tiny print. That has resulted in the addition of a
magnifying glass in each arbiter's kit. (As an aside, I might add that we
may have here an excellent example of the phenomenon of unintended
consequences inasmuch as state records disclose that the cadre of accept-
1991]
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able entertainment industry arbitrators has increasingly been filing
worker's compensation claims for diminished eyesight).
If you have ever wondered why it is that you so commonly encoun-
ter in your arbiters a spirit of meek humility and self-effacing expressions
of insecurity - perhaps here is your answer. In us, you witness an en-
dangered species threatened by engulfment in obscure and inexorably in-
creasing verbiage, creating an overcast of an ever-thickening greenhouse
effect, shielding out the pristine light of pure intent from which we ines-
capably derive our nourishment.
In concluding, let me share with you some interesting numbers that
Alliance of Motion Picture and Television Producers ("AMPTP") vice-
president of Legal Affairs Carol Lombardini graciously shared with me.
You may assess as you will the significance of them. The AMPTP has
accumulated a number of arbitrator's written decisions since 1960 that
presumably would shed light on the protective importance, or lack of it,
of the semantic coral reefs accumulating in guild collective-bargaining
agreements. Although it has no SAG cases in its files, it does have 240 of
the IATSE and various craft union's cases since the 1960's, and it has
255 WGA cases and 190 DGA cases in and since the 1970's. Without
SAG, that totals 685 arbitral decisions since 1960. As one reflects on the
implications of arbitral activity, must it not be somewhat chastening that
there should be so many arbitrations despite all of those safeguarding
thousands of retained and accumulating words and phrases? You under-
stand, of course, speaking for myself and my fellow arbitrators, we are
not complaining about this situation to labor and management. Keep up
the good work!
[Vol. I11
